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Abstract. The COVID-19 pandemic has posed a unique challenge for
the world to find solutions, ranging from vaccines to ICT solutions to
slow down the virus spreading. Due to the highly contagious nature of
the virus, social distancing is one fundamental measure which has already
adopted by many countries. At the technical level, this prioritises contact
tracing solutions, which can alert the users who have been in close contact
with the infected persons and meanwhile allow heath authorities to take
proper actions. In this paper, we examine several existing privacy-aware
contact tracing solutions and analyse their (dis)advantages. At the end,
we describe several major observations and outline an interdisciplinary
research agenda towards more comprehensive and effective privacy-aware
contact tracing solutions.
1 Introduction
The Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, caused by the SARS-CoV-2
virus, has put the world into a panic mode. Up to now, the virus has contracted
more than 2 million victims, and more than 120 thousands victims have lost
their lives1. Among the survivors, many of them are in critical conditions and
heavily rely on medical equipments such as ventilators to survive. It is reported
that many victims have tragically died due to the shortage of such equipments2.
While these numbers are still increasing on a daily basis, the world has united
unprecedentedly to find solutions to suppress the pandemic.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), on 31 December 2019,
the WHO China Country Office was informed of a pneumonia of unknown cause,
detected in the city of Wuhan in Hubei province, China. Soon, similar cases, later
being attributed to COVID-19, appeared in Wuhan and Hubei province rapidly.
1 https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019-20_coronavirus_pandemic
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To combat the epidemic, the Chinese government adopted a variety of extreme
measures, e.g. completely close the borders of villages, cities, and provinces; track
and then quarantine all close contacts of COVID-19 victims; make wearing masks
mandatory. From the public information, the epidemic has been successfully
controlled in China and only dozens of new cases are identified daily now. In a
sharp contrast, the numbers are still rapidly growing in the western democracies,
where some of these extreme measures cannot be easily enforced due to the
potential violation of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, in order to slow down
the virus spreading and reduce the pressure on medical systems, social distancing
is widely promoted and enforced, furthermore many countries are investigating
the concept of contact tracing. Without careful considerations, contact tracing
can turn into a massive surveillance tool so that individual’s privacy can be
seriously damaged, see the case analysis for China 3 and for South Korea 4.
What makes things harder is that the perception of privacy heavily depends on
the political regime and the underlying culture, see the analysis by Asghar et al.
towards Singapore’s TraceTogether app5.
It remains an open problem to design privacy-aware contact tracing solutions
which also satisfy the requirements in other dimensions.
1.1 SoTA of Privacy-aware contact tracing
Up to now, a number of contact tracing solutions have been introduced. For
instance, China and South Korea have begun tracing COVID-19 victims and
their contacts from the very early stage of the epidemic, via smartphones as well
as face recognition technologies. In addition, the Korean government even made
a lot of collected data public6. On one hand, these mandatory tracing solutions
greatly facilitate the containment of the virus, but on the other hand it also
raises serious privacy concerns7 [5].
Recently, the Singapore government published an app, named TraceTogether
8, which exploits some cryptographic primitives for privacy protection. This app
has attracted the attention from some other countries, such as Australia, which
are currently evaluating its privacy guarantee according to their own privacy
regulations, see [2]. At the end of March 2020, Israel passed an emergency law
to launch a smartphone app to reveal if a user was, over the previous 14 days,
3 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.
html
4 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y
5 http://tiny.cc/fljqmz
6 https://coronamap.site/
7 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y
8 http://tiny.cc/onlqmz
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in close proximity to anyone who has contracted the virus. Besides the efforts at
the national level, initiatives have also been started by the general public. For
instance, a Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT)
project has been kicked off with both public and private partners from several EU
countries9, MIT is collaborating with WHO to advocate its app named Private
Kit: Safe Paths10, Google and Apple are also collaborating on new solutions11.
There are also more theoretical proposals, e.g. those from [1,3,4,7].
In the meantime, the concept of contact tracing and proposed solutions have
been scrutinized by commenters and researchers. For instance, Anderson provide
very insightful analysis on the practical aspects of contact tracing12. Wang gave
some interesting remarks on current contact tracing solutions13, including that
from Google and Apple solutions14. Asghar et al. analysed Singapore’s Trace-
Together app15, and Vaudenay [8] provided a detailed analysis of the DP-3T
solution by Troncoso et al. [4].
1.2 Contribution
In this paper, we aim at a deeper understanding about the utility and privacy
issues associated with emerging contact tracing solutions, particularly those re-
lated to respiratory system diseases such as COVID-19. Our contribution lies in
three aspects.
1. We analyse the application context in this COVID-19 pandemic and identify
a broad set of utility and security requirements.
2. We examine several existing privacy-aware contact tracing solutions and
analyse their (dis)advantages. These solutions include the TraceTogether app
from Singapore16 and three cryptographic solutions by Reichert et al. [7] and
Altuwaiyan et al. [1] and Troncoso et al. [4]. It is worth noting that many
similar solutions exist and more apps are being developed, and we wish our
analysis can be extended to them.
3. We summarize our findings into several major observations and outline an
interdisciplinary research agenda towards more comprehensive and effective
privacy-aware contact tracing solutions.
9 https://www.pepp-pt.org/
10 http://safepaths.mit.edu/
11 https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/
12 http://tiny.cc/2z0zmz
13 http://tiny.cc/tx0zmz
14 https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/
15 http://tiny.cc/fljqmz
16 http://tiny.cc/onlqmz
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Note that many of the above works have not been formally published, so
that they might be updated by their authors from time to time. Nevertheless,
we base our analysis on some specific versions which were available when this
paper has been written, as indicated in the references.
2 A Closer Look at Contact Tracing
In the public health domain, contact tracing refers to the process of identifica-
tion of contacts who may have come into contact with an infected victim and
subsequent collection of further information about these contacts. By tracing the
contacts of infected individuals, testing them for infection, treating the infected
and tracing their contacts in turn, public health aims to reduce infections in
the population17. In practice, contact tracing is widely performed for diseases
like sexually transmitted infections (including HIV) and virus infections (e.g.
SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19). Despite some pioneering attempts
in applying advanced ICT technologies, e.g. the FluPhone [9], contact tracing
has mainly been implemented manually by medical personnel. Regardless, this
approach has been proven effective in combating contiguous diseases because it
can at least (1) interrupt ongoing transmission and reduce spread, alert contacts
to the possibility of infection and offer preventive counseling or prophylactic
care and (2) allow the medical professionals to learn about the epidemiology in
a particular population.
Ferretti et al. [5] investigated the key parameters of epidemic spread for
COVID-19 and concluded that viral spread is too fast to be contained by man-
ual contact tracing (see an illustration in Fig. 1) but could be controlled if this
process was faster, more efficient and happened at scale. This necessitates digital
contact tracing solutions, such as those based on mobile apps, which can effi-
ciently achieve epidemic control in large scale. Interestingly, this coincides with
the empirical analysis of the control measures in China, by Tian et al. [6].
In the following-up discussions, we focus on digital contact tracing solutions,
by cautiously referring to their manual ancestors in the aspect of functional
requirements. For simplicity, we omit the term “digital” in the rest of the paper.
2.1 Preliminary on contact tracing
Overall, the purpose of a contact tracing solution is to prevent an epidemic or a
pandemic caused by a contagious virus or something similar. Depending on the
standing point, it may serve (at least) two purposes.
17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contact_tracing
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Fig. 1. Quarantine Plan (taken from [5])
– At a global level, it helps medical personnel to trace the pattern of virus
spreading, produce transmission graphs, trace the origin of the virus, and
so on. With adequate knowledge of the virus, the authority can take appro-
priate actions (e.g. disinfecting a facility) and make appropriate plans (e.g.
enforcing social distancing) to fight against the virus and prevent future
similar epidemic or pandemic.
– At an individual level, it helps the medical personnel to alert individuals
who might have been infected. Alternatively, it may allow an individual to
evaluate his/her risks of being infected and take further actions. As a quick
remark, most cryptographic solutions focus on the individual-level contact
tracing and devoted their attention to privacy protection for individuals.
For many diseases, such as COVID-19, an individual might contract the virus
with either direct or indirect contact to the infected person. In case of direct
contact, we can imagine that the droplets containing virus from the infected can
fly to his mouth, nose, or eyes. In addition, the droplets might also attach to his
clothes. In case of indirect contact, we can imagine that the infected leaves virus-
droplets on a book, a chair, or any physical objects, and later on an individual
might tough the object and contract the virus. Taking the COVID-19 as an
example, the virus can be transmitted through either direct or indirect contacts,
so that it makes comprehensive contact tracing a very hard problem.
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To design a contact tracing solution, the main anchor is location data. In-
tuitively, if two persons are located in close locations at a certain point of time
then we can informally assume that they have close contact with each other18. In
reality, other anchoring technologies might be employed, such as face recognition
and other AI-based tracking technologies. However, we do not consider them be-
cause such technologies are only deployed in very limited regions of the world.
With the abundance of electronic gadgets, location data can be generated and
collected in many ways, e.g. GPS, WIFI, Telcom Cell Towers, Bluetooth beacons.
Broadly, we can categorize location data into two categories.
– One is absolute location data. In this category, we can think of GPS location,
location with respect to static WIFI access points and Telcom cell towers. A
location data point can often be written in the form of geolocation coordinate
pair.
– The other is relative location data. In this category, we can think about the
pairing of two Bluetooth-enabled smart devices, the boarding on a trans-
portation tool such as planes, buses, cars, or ships. In this case, we can have
some reference description about the location, for example both persons are
on the same flight on the day XYZ.
Besides the difference in collection and management, when being applied in
contact tracing solutions, they also have very different precision and security
implications.
With respect to precision, absolute location data is often generated by exter-
nal infrastructures and might not be precise enough to define “close contact” in a
epidemic and pandemic. On the other hand, such location data can be collected
constantly and will provide a big picture on the mobility patterns of individuals.
In contrast, relative location could be more precise. But in order to collect such
data, we need to assume a large potion of the population will install the same
app to support the service. Another drawback of this type of location data is
that it might be ad hoc and will not be able to provide a comprehensive view
of individuals’ mobility history. Moreover, it is hard to use such data alone to
study the transmission pattern of a disease in a population. It seems that, in
order to facilitate the global and individual level objectives, a contact tracing
solution should be based on fusing location data of both categories.
With respect to security, two aspects are of crucial importance. One aspect
is data authenticity. In some scenarios, absolute location data could be more
authentic because a third party could offer some sort of attestation. For instance,
a Telcom operator can attest the location of an individual’s smartphone. In
contrast, it is harder to find attestations on an individual’s relative location
data. However, there are exceptions. For instance, if a user presented a boarding
18 Note that there are exceptions though.
6
pass for a flight, then it can be an attestation that this user is on the plane during
a certain period of time. The other aspect is privacy. Naturally, we can imagine
that authentic data has tight bound to the identity of an individual so that it
will be more privacy invasive if disclosed. It is a difficult task to balance the
authenticity and privacy of location data and some tradeoff might be inevitable.
2.2 System Architecture and Requirements
With respect to the existing contact tracing solutions, there is neither a uni-
form system architecture nor a defined set of participants. Nonetheless, all the
potential participants can be divided into two groups. In one group, there are
individual users, who either have been confirmed with infection or have the risk
of being infected when in close contact with the infected. In the other group,
there are third parties, which vary in specific solutions. For instance, one po-
tential player in this group is the health authority and medical personnel, who
need to evaluate the situation and help the individual users if necessary. If a
contact tracing solution relies on smartphone apps, then the developer of this
app may also be involved. In case that individual users needs to communicate
with each other, then a server may be required to facilitate the communication.
Without loss of generality, the system architecture can be illustrated as in Fig. 2,
where (Ê, Ë, Ì,Í) indicate the four phases in the workflow of a contact tracing
solution, i.e. (initialisation, sensing, reporting, tracing).
– In the initialisation phase, individual users and relevant third parties need
to set up the system to enable the operations in other phases. For example,
every individual user might be required to have a smart phone and download
an app from a third party. In addition, cryptographic credentials may need
to be generated and distributed.
– In the sensing phase, individual users will record their own location trails
and also collect location data from their close contacts.
– In the reporting phase, if an individual user is confirmed to be infected then
she needs to collaborate with some third parties to make her relevant location
data available for the further uses.
– In the tracing phase, some third parties could collect and aggregate the loca-
tion data from infected individuals for any possible legitimate purposes. For
instance, a third party can communicate with the close contacts of the in-
fected, or let the uninfected individuals to evaluate the risks of being infected
on their own.
In comparison to other digital solutions (e.g. a general-purpose social app), a
contact tracing solution is expected to provide stricter guarantees towards utility
and security.
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Fig. 2. System Architecture
As to utility, the solution should provide fine-grained and accurate mea-
surement of the distance between a contact and the infected victim. The “fine-
grained” requirement refers to a precise description of the occurring time and
the duration of the contacting event, while the “accurate” requirement means
that the error in the distance measurement should be as small as possible. Take
the COVID-19 as an example, it is commonly considered that there is a risk
when a contact and the infected victim stay together within 2 meters. In this
case, if a GPS system has the error around 5 meters, then it should not be used
alone in any solution.
The security guarantee imposes requirements on the protection for both au-
thenticity and privacy.
– The “authenticity” requirement means that the reported location data from
a user must be real and should not have been forged or modified by anybody
including the user herself. Lacking of authenticity can cause a lot of serious
issues, as happened in China and South Korea. For example, an infected
victim can blackmail a shop by claiming that she has been a visitor, an
infected victim can cause a social panic by claiming that she has visited
some heavily populated areas such as shopping malls or train stations, a
user can forge location data in order to probe the location data of infected
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victims and identify them given that some matching service is offered, and
fake location data from infected users can mislead medical personnel in their
professional activities.
In addition, the “authenticity” requirement can be extended to the binding
property between the location data to an individual. Quite often, smart
devices are used to collect and manage location data, while such devices can
be shared by several individuals. Lacking of binding can lead to some fraud
activities. For example, an individual user can present another user’s device
and location data to get a priority in virus testing or avoid going to work by
triggering some quarantine policy on purpose.
– The “privacy” requirement applies to both infected victims and other users.
Except for disclosing the necessary information to the authorities, an in-
fected victim might want to prevent any further disclosure to avoid social
embarrassment or discrimination. An individual user may want to check his
risk of being infected by matching his location data with that from infected,
but he may not want to disclose his data to the third parties or the infected
for any other purpose.
Note that the DP-3T consortium recently published a summary of privacy
and security threats19.
3 Analysis of Existing Solutions
In this section, we provide some high-level analysis of several solutions against
our formulation in Section 2. The common issues with these solutions are sum-
marized into the major observations in Section 4.
3.1 Singapore’s TraceTogether
The TraceTogether protocol from Singapore, as recapped in [2], has two types
of entities, namely users (1 ≤ i ≤ N) and the Ministry of Health (MoH) of the
Singapore government. It is assumed that all users trust the MoH to protect
their information. Note that, as shown below, the users are not required to share
everything with MoH if they have not been in close contact with any confirmed
COVID-19 victim. The protocol is elaborated below.
– In the initialisation phase, a user i downloads the TraceTogether app and
install it on her smartphone. The app sends the phone number NUMi to
19 https://github.com/DP-3T/documents
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MoH and receives a pseudonym IDi. MoH stores the (NUMi, IDi) pair in
its database.
MoH generates a secret key K and selects an encryption algorithm Enc. At
the beginning of the app launch, MoH decides some time intervals [t0, t1, · · · ],
which will end when the pandemic is over. For the user i, MoH pushes
TIDi,x = Enc(IDi, tx;K) to user i’s app at the beginning of tx, for x ≥ 0.
– In the sensing phase, user i broadcasts TIDi,x at the time interval [tx, tx+1)
for all x ≥ 0. For example, when user i and user j come into a range of
Bluetooth communication at the interval [tx, tx+1), then they will exchange
TIDi,x and TIDj,x. They will store a (TIDi,x, T IDj,x, Sigstren) locally
in their smartphones, respectively. The parameter Sigstren indicates the
Bluetooth signal strength between their devices.
– In the reporting phase, suppose that user i has been tested positive for
COVID-19, then she is obliged to share with MoH the locally-stored pairs
(TIDi,x, T IDj,x) for all relevant j and x.
– In the tracing phase, after receiving the pairs from user i, MoH decrypts
every TIDj,x and obtains IDj . Based on IDj , MoH can looks up NUMj
and then contact user j for further instructions.
Whether or not to install the TraceTogether app is a voluntary choice for the
Singapore residents, and it is not clear how many installations have been made
until this moment. So far, we have not found any official information showing
how much this app has contributed to Singapore’s war against COVID-19. Soon
after its launch, Asghar et al. pointed out some privacy concerns20. We have the
following additional comments.
With TraceTogether, individual users are required to put more trust on the
third party - MoH, than in other solutions. Note that this might be a result of
the political regime and cultural status of Singapore. To prevent a curious MoH
from learning unnecessary mobility information, the mobility data of low-risk in-
dividuals are not required to be uploaded to MoH. However, things will change
when more and more individual users are infected and diagnosed. By then, MoH
will have decrypted data for most of the individuals and learned their relative lo-
cation data at certain points of time. If a big portion of the Singapore population
has deployed the app, and then the location data on their smartphones would
provide MoH a very clear mobility view of the whole Singapore population.
Without using secure hardware or other trusted computing technology, a
malicious user can potentially manipulate the location data collected by the app,
e.g. delete or add entries. Moreover, an attacker can mount relay attacks, e.g. to
relay the Bluetooth signal from Alice’s smartphone to Bob’s smartphone even
when they are far from each other. To this end, some other attacks, demonstrated
in Vaudenay’s analysis [8] against DP-3T solution by Troncoso et al. [4], can also
20 http://tiny.cc/fljqmz
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apply. Regarding the solutions employing Bluetooth for distance measurement,
one attack deserves special attention. An attacker can place a Bluetooth range
extender in a relatively populated place, such as a city square, and as a result it
will make any pair of users a close contact to each other. Such an attack is easy
to mount and will seriously distort the functionality of the underlying solution.
In comparison to other solutions, one advantage of TraceTogether is that
it offers MoH the ability to draw the transmission graph of COVID-19 in the
population which has installed the app. It can be easily done based on the fact
that the temporary identifiers are linked to the phone numbers, which can help
MoH identify the individual users. This advantage is an outcome of the tradeoff
between privacy and utility.
3.2 Reichert et al.’s MPC Solution
In the solution proposed by Reichert et al. [7], it is assumed that user i (1 ≤
i ≤ N) possesses a smart device that can collect and store geolocation data.
In addition, a Health Authority (HA) will collect the geolocation history of all
COVID-19 victims and offers data matching as a service.
– In the initialisation phase, HA prepares the cryptographic key materials for
generating garbled circuits for later use.
– In the sensing phase, user i records her geolocation data points on the fly.
Let the time intervals be denoted by [t0, t1, · · · ]. At time tx, user i generates
and stores a tuple (tx, lx,u, lx,v), where lx,u and lx,v represent the latitude
and longitude of the location, respectively.
– In the reporting phase, if user i has been tested positive for COVID-19, then
she shares with HA her (tx, lx,u, lx,v) for all relevant x.
– In the tracing phase, suppose user j wants to check whether he has been in
close contact with any COVID-19 victim. For any COVID-19 victim user i,
HA constructs a garbled circuit based on her geolocation data points and
shares the circuit with user j, who can then retrieve some key materials from
the HA and privately evaluate the circuit based on his own geolocation data
points. Note that user j is assumed to have high risk if, for some of her data
point(s), both the time stamps and the geolocation coordinates are close to
one of that from user i.
This is a theoretical cryptographic solution, which covers the matching be-
tween an infected and other individual users while ignoring other aspects of a
contact tracing solution. With respect to the cryptographic design, scalability
will be a bottleneck. For any user j, HA will need to prepare garbled circuits for
all the infected victims, and interact with user j in the tracing phase. When the
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sizes of infected populations and the requesters become large, the complexity for
HA will be formidable. In addition, malicious users might leverage this to mount
(D)DoS attacks, unless proper countermeasures are deployed. Another issue is
the lacking of details on the computation of infection risks, which are based on
the proximity of both stamps and the geolocation coordinates. It is unclear how
to set a threshold on the time stamps, considering there are a variety of mobility
patterns between the concerned users.
3.3 Altuwaiyan et al.’s Matching Solution
In the solution proposed by Altuwaiyan et al. [1], it is assumed that user i
(1 ≤ i ≤ N) possesses a smart device that can exchange information (e.g.
Bluetooth messages) with similar devices nearby. In addition, a server will collect
the data of all infected victims and offer data matching as a service.
– In the initialisation phase, there is no special setup for the server and users.
– In the sensing phase, user i exchanges information with similar devices
nearby. Let the time intervals be denoted by [t0, t1, · · · ]. At time tx, user i
generates and stores a tuple of data points (tx, (mi,1, ri,1, pi,1), · · · , (mi,ni,x , ri,ni,x , pi,ni,x)),
where (mi,1, ri,1, pi,1) records information about the first encountered device,
where mi,1 is the hashed identifier of this device, ri,1 is the detected signal
strength and pi,1 is the type of device, and so on.
– In the reporting phase, if user i has been tested positive, then she shares
with the server her data (tx, (mi,1, ri,1, pi,1), · · · , (mi,ni,x , ri,ni,x , pi,ni,x) for
all relevant x.
– In the tracing phase, suppose user j wants to check whether he has been
in close contact with some infected victim, he generates a public/private
key pair (pk, sk) for a homomorphic encryption scheme. Then, user j sends
the timestamps in his data to the server, which will find all the infected
users who have some overlapped timestamps. For each such infected user i
and overlapped timestamp tx, the server and user j perform the following
protocol.
1. User j sends (Enc(mj,1, pk), · · · ,Enc(mj,nj,x , pk)) to the server.
2. The server computes the following matrix and sends it to user j.
Rand(Enc(mj,1 −mi,1, pk)) · · · Rand(Enc(mj,nj,x −mi,1, pk))
...
...
...
Rand(Enc(mj,1 −mi,ni,x , pk)) · · · Rand(Enc(mj,nj,x −mi,nj,x , pk))
In the table, Rand is a ciphertext randomization function. If the cipher-
text encrypts 0 then the randomized ciphertext still encrypts 0, otherwise
the randomized ciphertext will encrypt a random number.
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3. User j decrypts every ciphertext in the received matrix, and obtains the
mj,y, where 1 ≤ y ≤ nj,x, which is overlapped with that from user i.
Then, user j sends all the matched mj,y together with rj,y to the server.
4. Based on the data from user j, the server computes the distance between
user i and user j, and then acts accordingly.
We note that, in addition to the aforementioned privacy-aware matching pro-
tocol, the other contribution of Altuwaiyan et al. [1] is a new method to measure
the distance between two smart devices. In comparison to other solutions where
the distance is measured based on the perceived signal strength of the peer de-
vice, the method leverages on the signal strengths of more devices so that it is
more accurate in practice.
Regarding privacy, the infected victims reveal the location data to the server,
where the location data contain hashed network identifiers such as those of WIFI
access points. Give that network identifiers are often static, this allows the server
to recover the absolute location data points of the infected users. If a match
has been found in the tracing phase, then user j’s absolute location at some
time stamps are also revealed to the server. In addition, in order to improve
computational efficiency, time stamps are always disclosed to the server. The
revelation of time stamps and absolute location implies serious privacy leakage,
and should be avoided.
3.4 DP-3T Solution
In the solution proposed by Troncoso et al. [4], it is assumed that user i (1 ≤ i ≤
N) possesses a smart device that can collect and store data. In addition, there
is a backend server, and the Health Authority (HA). Note that the backend
server acts as a communication platform to facilitate the matching activities
among the users. Let H, PRG and PRF denote a cryptographic hash function, a
pseudorandom number generator and a pseudorandom function, respectively.
– In the initialisation phase, user i generates a random initial daily key SKi,0,
and computes the following-up daily keys based on a chain of hashes: i.e.
the key for day 1 is SKi,1 = H(SKi,0) and the key for day x is SKi,x =
H(SKi,x−1). Suppose n ephemeral identifiers are required in one day, then
the identifiers for user i on the day x are generated as follows:
EphIDi,x,1|| · · · ||EphIDi,x,n = PRG(PRF(SKi,x, “broadcastkey”))
– In the sensing phase, on the day x, user i broadcasts the ephemeral iden-
tifiers {EphIDi,x,1, · · · , EphIDi,x,n} in a random order. At the same time,
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her smart device stores the received ephemeral identifiers together with the
corresponding proximity (based on signal strength), duration, and other aux-
iliary data, and a coarse time indication (e.g., “The morning of April 2).
– In the reporting phase, if user i has been tested positive for COVID-19, then
HA will instruct her to send SKi,x to the backend server, where x is the first
day that user i becomes infectious.
After sending the SKi,x to the backend server, user i chooses a new daily key
SKi,y depending on the day when this event occurs. While not mentioned
in [4], we believe this new key should also be sent to the backend server, as
user i might continue to be infectious.
– In the tracing phase, periodically, the backend server broadcasts SKi,x after
user i has been confirmed with the infection. On receiving SKi,x, user j can
recompute the ephemeral identifiers for day x as follows
PRG(PRF(SKi,x, “broadcastkey”)).
Similarly, user j can compute the identifiers for day x + 1 and so on. With
the ephemeral identifiers, user j can check whether any of the computed
identifiers appears in her local storage. Based on the associated information,
namely “proximity, duration, and other auxiliary data, and a coarse time
indication”, user j can act accordingly.
Vaudenay [8] provided detailed security and privacy analysis against this
solution. It argues that decentralisation introduces new attack vectors against
privacy, contrasting to the common belief that decentralisation helps solve the
privacy concerns in centralised systems. One of the conclusions from [8] is that
trusted computing technology seems unavoidable in order to prevent all the
identified attacks.
As noted by Vaudenay [8], a lot of practical details are missing from the
whitepaper [4]. For instance, it is unclear how to instantiate the backend server.
With regard to its pan European ambition, it is not clear how HAs and backend
servers from different countries can efficiently coordinate with each other to take
prompt responses. It also remains open how users’ privacy will be infected if the
credentials of some HAs and backend servers are compromised. We want to point
out that the hashchain-based method of generating daily keys, see more infor-
mation in the initialisation phase, brings linkability risks when an individual’s
credential is leaked to an attacker, e.g. via malware. For example, if the attacker
learns SKi,x then it can compute identifiers for day x + 1 and so on. Then, the
attacker can link user i to his broadcasted identifiers, either collected by the
attacker itself or or bought from other attackers. This could lead to disclosure
of absolute location data points of user i.
By design, the DP-3T protocol favors more the privacy for user j than the in-
fected user i. Referring to the tracing phase description, if an identifier EphID∗
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appears in his local storage user j learns the exact time stamp when the per-
ceived risk occurs. This can very likely enable user j to link EphID∗ to the real
person, whose device has broadcasted EphID∗, due to the fact that user j can
be close to very few users at a specific time stamp. Moreover, this also raises a
concern of targeted identification attack. If an attacker wants to find out whether
or not some users have been infected, then he can simply get close enough to
them and make their devices exchange identifiers (of course he should record
the time stamps), and finally he can make a decision if identifiers have been
matched at these time stamps. In contrast, the TraceTogether avoids this prob-
lem by letting MoH calculate the infection risk for encountered users. Overall,
the DP-3T protocol leaks too much unnecessary information about the infected
users to the public and raises serious privacy concerns without deploying any
further countermeasure. One possible solution is to deploy a two party secure
computation protocol between the backend server and user j, for the latter to
only learn a risk score. How to scale this up is a very practical problem to be
addressed.
4 Discussion and a Future Research Roadmap
After examining many privacy-aware contact tracing solutions, we feel that the
situation is a bit chaotic at this moment. There is a rush for the academia to
propose new technical solutions and for the industry to launch new apps, and new
initiatives pop up every day. These efforts will somehow contribute to the fight
against the pandemic, at least raise the awareness and help start discussions.
Unfortunately, it is a pity that many solutions are based on assumptions which
are unrealistic and hamper their usefulness and massive adoption. In this section,
we first discuss our major observations, partly based on the analysis in Section
3, and then put forward a roadmap which foresees an interdisciplinary research
agenda for the future.
The first major observation is that many solutions only focused on the direct
contact scenario and paid little attention to the precision of location data and
the accuracy of distance measurement (e.g. those based on Bluetooth signal
strength). In addition, a number of exceptional situations have not been taken
into account. For instance, the neighbours of an infected and quarantined victim
can be in very close range and be classified to be of high risk, while the truth is
that they are in different apartments or houses so that the risk of being infected
is low. Inaccurate distance estimation and false risk alerts will cause unnecessary
panic in the population and also waste a lot of resources in the healthcare system
to address the fake suspects. Moreover, the scenario of indirect contact has been
ignored most of the time. Due to the fact that COVID-19 can be transmitted
via indirect contact. Ignoring this scenario makes the existing contact tracing
solutions less practical and effective than expected.
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The second major observation is that the scope of contact tracing in existing
solutions is very narrow. It is mostly about an individual evaluates his risk of
being infected based on his contact history with the infected victims. However,
as we have described in the beginning of Section 2 and Section 2.1, contact trac-
ing is supposed to enable health authority and medical personnel not only to
study the epidemic or pandemic at the global level but also to help the individual
at the individual level. This raises an open question how the health authority
and medical personnel can collect the necessary information and perform their
normal duties. Inevitably, new privacy-aware solutions need to be designed and
implemented to fulfill the objectives of a comprehensive contact tracing yet min-
imizes information disclosure. One root problem, facing both existing and new
solutions, is that a consensus on the trust relationship between the different
players in the scope of contact tracing is missing. When an app is deployed,
more practical questions can occur. For example, how the results from the app
of Google and Apple21 should be interpreted, how the liability is distributed,
and can an individual interact with the health authority and medical personnel
on the basis of these results?
The third major observation is that most solutions only emphasized the pri-
vacy concerns in contact tracing while paying no attention to the authenticity
aspect (elaborated in Section 2.2). It implies that individual users can poten-
tially forge location data for herself and for others as well. Consequently, the
results of contact tracing could have been manipulated to a large extent, and
enable the dishonest users and attackers to disrupt the service and commit vari-
ous fraud activities. Of particular importance is that the lacking of authenticity
can also lead to the breach of privacy, as demonstrated by Vaudenay [8]. How to
balance authenticity and privacy seems to be the biggest challenge in designing
a privacy-aware and effective contact tracing solution.
The fourth major observation is that most theoretical solutions have not pro-
vided all the technical details to facilitate an implementation. In many solutions,
an un-trusted backend server is required. It is unclear how this server can be
chosen in practice and how to incentivize it to perform in the same way as what
has specified. Furthermore, a health authority is often involved and required to
perform some cryptographic operations. This seems to be an unrealistic require-
ment for an governmental authority in many countries. At least, it will not be
easily done in a short period of time.
To fight against a pandemic, like COVID-19, every technology and solution
could matter. Nevertheless, we believe it is also important to set an interdisci-
plinary agenda to comprehensively formulate the problem, identify the require-
ments, and search for the opportunities. We foresee the following key research
elements on the roadmap.
21 https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/
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– Bridge the gap between health authority and solution designers. This essen-
tially requires the solution designers to figure out what an effective contact
tracing solution needs to generate, for both individual users, health author-
ity and the medical personnel. Accordingly, different players’ roles should be
clearly defined. Decisions should be drawn on the basis of regulations (at
least) related to healthcare and privacy.
– Evaluate and model the privacy and other security risks. This will need to
clarify the trust relationships among the players and result in a set of se-
curity requirements, which should be satisfy by a solution. It should also
reflect the accountability and liability configuration among the players. Var-
ious tradeoffs could be inevitable among privacy, utility, efficiency and other
aspects.
– Build incentive mechanisms into solutions from the beginning. Instead of
simply providing a dichotomy choice through “opt-in” and “opt-out”, it is
important to incentivize the participation of individual users and other play-
ers, e.g. by employing technologies such as DLT or Blockchain. It is also im-
portant to deploy mechanisms to deter dishonest and malicious behaviours
and encourage honest behaviour for the society good. In particular, it should
prevent the solutions from being used in any manner as a surveillance tool
for either political or economic purposes.
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